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1 From the days  of  the “Entente  Cordiale” to  the signing of  the 2010 Lancaster  House
treaties, the history of Franco-British defence relations shows that the two countries
agree on the necessity of cooperation in order to protect their national interests, and
promote shared values like parliamentary democracy or individual freedoms.1 Close
diplomatic  ties  between  the  two  countries  did  not  prevent  a  prolonged  debate  on
security issues in Europe that only ended in the 1990s.2 Current cooperation between
France and the UK falls under the terms of the Lancaster House Treaties which were
signed on 2 November 2010. The 2010 treaties are a new step in the history of bilateral
cooperation and the aim of this paper is to recall the strategic, political and economic
reasons that led the two countries to take a new step as well as examine the current
state of cooperation. But it is impossible to study Franco-British cooperation without
studying the impact it has on European defence, in particular on Common Security and
Defence  Policy  (CSDP).  Should  the  signing  of  the  Lancaster  House  Treaties  be
interpreted as a desire from France and the UK to give up on CSDP?3 Or can Lancaster
House be considered as a step forward for future European defence?4
2 In  order  to  understand  the  rationale  for  cooperation  and  account  for  France  and
Britain’s decision to sign the 2010 treaties, the concepts of “role-playing” and “national
role conceptions” are particularly useful. Roles have been defined as social positions,5
and  “repertoires  of  behaviour,  inferred  from  others  expectations  and  one’s  own
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conceptions, selected at least partly in response to cues and demands.”6 Role theory
and the “National role conception” concept have been first defined by K. J. Holsti as
“The policymakers’ own definitions of decisions, commitments, rules and actions
suitable to their state, and of the functions, if any, their state should perform on a
continuing basis in the international system or in subordinate regional systems.”7
3 In other words, “national role conceptions” refer to the ideas that states hold about
their proper place in international affairs. Another useful concept defined by Holsti is
that of “role performances” which refers to the policy actions appropriate to given
roles. What Holsti explained is that states’ decision to act or respond through policy is
mainly  determined  by  policymakers’  national  role  conception  in  the  international
system. Following Holsti’s seminal work, researchers have studied the manner foreign
policy is influenced by role conceptions,8 the historical and cultural roots of national
roles,9 or domestic contestation of national roles.10 While other international relations
theories (like realism and – to a certain extent – constructivism) focus on structural
factors  to  account  for  state  behaviour,  role  theory  includes  ideational  factors  and
consider states as agents.11 Therefore, a role theory approach opens the possibility of
understanding interactions between agents and the structure in the definition of roles
and their realisation.12 But studying role expectations also requires to take into account
both an “ego” part (the “self”) and an “alter” part (the “other[s]”) that may conflict.13
In other words,  material  factors have to be taken into account alongside ideational
factors in order to account for the way conceptions leaders have of their country’s
place  in  the  world  are  related  to  ideational  and  material  constraints  imposed  by
“others,” including outside its borders.14
4 Although bilateralism could be questioned as a relevant form of cooperation given the
complexity of the contemporary multi-layered environment, it remains “the dominant
practice in international relations,”15 especially within the EU. Indeed, as Keukeleire
noted: “The EU both embraces bilateralism as part of its densely-textured pattern of
multilateral interactions whilst at the same time providing both a new context for and
alternatives  to  traditional  bilateral  diplomacy.”16 Given  the  importance  of  bilateral
relations inside the EU framework,  scholars  agree Brexit  will  change the nature of
relations between the UK and member states: “one of the many imponderables in the
post-Brexit world is the way in which Britain’s key bilateral relationships with its […]
European partners is likely to change.”17 Research on bilateral relations in the field of
security  and  defence  has  focused  mainly  on  the  relationship  with  Germany18 and
France19 in order to question how cooperation would evolve now that one state is in the
EU and the other outside, and what this means for CSDP.
5 However,  previous  research  tends  to  focus  on  material  factors  only,  leaving  aside
ideational  reasons for cooperation.  The purpose of  this  article is  thus to show that
bilateral cooperation is likely to continue after the UK’s departure from the EU, because
the reasons that led to the signing of the Lancaster House treaties in 2010 have not
been invalidated over the last ten years and because France and the UK intend to keep
playing  a  forefront  role on  the  international  stage  in  a  context  in  which  it  is
increasingly difficult for them to do so on their own. Looking at the reasons that drove
France and the UK to sign these treaties, it is possible to identify three main sets of
reasons. First, there were strong financial incentives on both sides of the Channel to
further cooperation. Both states had to face dire budgetary constraints, especially after
the 2008 financial crisis, but they also wanted to retain their military power. This is the
“entente  frugale”  aspect  of  the  Franco-British  cooperation.20 The  second  reason  was
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strategic. France and the UK recognised they were closer to each other than to any
other  European  partners,  not  only  as  far  as  the  size  of  their  armed  forces  are
concerned, but also in terms of attitudes to military intervention. Both countries were
ready to deploy troops, something they had proved in the past, and therefore were
most likely to fight alongside each other.  This accounts for the important strategic
dimension to their cooperation. Finally, looking at the political context in which the
treaties were signed, it appears that there was no other choice but to further Franco-
British cooperation. The only other alternative would have been CSDP. The UK was
never really in favour of reinforcing EU defence policy, contrary to France, but even the
latter started doubting CSDP could be an efficient initiative.
 
An “entente frugale”: the financial rationale for
cooperation
6 In 2006, the NATO Member States set themselves the aim of spending at least 2% of
their  GDP  on  defence.  This  objective  was  not  primarily  intended  to  solve  the
Organisation’s funding issue but was used to reveal how committed each state was to
NATO’s common defence and aimed at maintaining the status of the Atlantic Alliance as
a  major  security  actor  in  the world.  Among NATO’s  European Member States,  only
Greece, Turkey, Bulgaria, France, the UK and Romania devoted at least 2% of their GDP
to defence in 2006. But among those countries, France and Britain were definitely the
most important contributors to the Alliance’s  budget  in absolute terms.  It  was this
share of  France’s  budget devoted to defence that made it  a  “serious” partner,  with
whom the UK could legitimately reinforce its links and deepen its bilateral relation.21
7 But it was also argued that, however large its defence budget compared to other states’,
Britain did not actually have any other choice than to reinforce its relation with France
if it wanted to avoid losing some of its defence capabilities.22 Indeed, the 2010 Strategic
Defence  and  Security  Review and  the  Future  Force  2020 programme  announced  a
reorganisation  of  the  armed  forces  through  cuts  in  the  total  number  of  military
personnel  and  a  reduction  in  combat  capabilities,  together  with  ambitious
modernisation plans. In a context of cuts in public spending, one of the main aims of
the 2010 review was to reduce the £36 billion deficit in the defence budget. In order to
do so, it was announced that defence procurement projects would be either delayed
(like the Trident replacement project),  cut  (like the number of  new destroyers and
frigates) or scrapped completely (like the Nimrod reconnaissance aircraft). HMS Ark
Royal, the navy’s sole operating aircraft carrier at the time, was taken out of service
along with its fleet of Harrier Jump Jets. The overall budget of the Ministry of Defence
was cut by 8%, which resulted in the loss of 17,000 military and 25,000 civilian jobs, and
inevitably led to a reduced role for British forces in major military interventions.
8 France also had to find solutions to face budgetary pressure. The 2008 economic crisis
further  aggravated  an  already  dire  budgetary  situation  with  the  2008  Livre  blanc
announcing  the  government’s  intention  to  close  83  military  bases  and  cut  54,000
defence  jobs.23 The  Livre  blanc also  stated  that  maintaining  France’s  strategic
independence would henceforth be difficult because it lacked the necessary funding.24
This was confirmed in 2010 when the five-yearly law on military programming voted in
2009 had to be amended to include extra spending cuts of up to €3.5 billion over 3 years
from 2011 to 2013. In that context, it was believed that cooperation with the UK could
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save substantial amounts of money, while allowing both states to keep their nuclear
capabilities as well as to protect key armament companies and technologies.
 
Nuclear Weapons
9 Following the creation of a Joint Commission on Nuclear Policies and Doctrines in 1992
that  later  became the  Joint  Nuclear  Commission  (JNC),  France  and  the  UK  have
enhanced their nuclear  cooperation without  threatening the  independence  of  their
respective nuclear forces.25 Cooperation in the field of nuclear deterrence has improved
over the last decades, with civil and military officials involved in French and British
nuclear  programmes meeting regularly.  But  before 2010,  the two countries  did not
have a joint nuclear policy and the USA has remained Britain’s closer ally in this area.26
In the 2010 SDSR, the government renewed its commitment to maintaining a nuclear-
armed missile submarine on patrol at all times (Continuous-At-Sea-Deterrence, CASD)
but the number of nuclear warheads was reduced and the decision to replace them was
delayed.27
10 The Lancaster House Treaty on nuclear weapons cooperation was thus a milestone in
French and British military history, especially as France long saw the nuclear domain
as too sensitive for cooperation. Among the decisions taken in 2010, the treaty planned
to allow British scientists to access the French research centre in Valduc where the
viability  and  safety  of  nuclear  warheads  are  tested.  A  new  joint  technology  and
development  centre  was  also  to  be  built  as  part of  the  British  atomic  weapons
establishment  at  Aldermaston  in  order  to  develop  the  radiographic  and  diagnostic
technology needed to support the hydrodynamic testing of nuclear weapons.
11 Since  2010,  progress  seems  to  have  been  swift  and  steady,28 and  the  positive
relationship in the field of nuclear weapons is unlikely to be affected by Brexit. The
initial motive for cooperation was financial, as both states wished to save money by
cutting duplicate costs. But their cooperation also relied on the fact that they were the
only two nuclear powers in Europe, which means they share different interests and
roles than other EU member states. Even after the UK leaves the EU, this is not likely to
change. The UK is committed to maintaining its deterrent and France has no other
partner  to  turn  to.  Doubts  about  the  future  of  NATO  and  the  US  commitment  to
European defence  even make the  French and British  nuclear  arsenals  all  the  more




12 The  2010  Lancaster  House  Treaty  created  a  High-Level  Working  Group  that  meets
several  times  a  year  in  order  to  coordinate  Franco-British  armaments  cooperation.
There has been some progress on armaments cooperation, in spite of some failures,
such as the decision by the British to revert to the F-35 short take-off and vertical
landing (STOVL) variant of the Joint Strike Fighter, making its carriers incompatible
with French aircraft technology. One of the most important successes in the field of
armaments cooperation is the One Complex Weapons initiative which covers a large
range of  joint  missile  projects  as  well  the development of  centres  of  excellence by
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MBDA.  The  two  countries  have  thus  reached  genuine  interdependence  in  a  highly
strategic sector.
13 Many  decisions  were  made  before  June  2016  (including  the  concept  phase  for  the
Future  Cruise/Anti-Ship  Weapon,  or  the  SCALP/Storm  Shadow  cruise  missile).  But
another series of agreements were signed after the Brexit vote, like those regarding
future  long-range  weapons,  the  future  CTA40  cannon,  or  on  further  sharing
hydrodynamic  testing  facilities  to  increase  naval  cooperation.29 However,  other
projects could be threatened by either financial, technical or political difficulties.30 For
instance, the initial Franco-British Future Combat Air System (FCAS) project has stalled
and the British announced in 2018 they would develop their own Tempest programme
while a new FCAS programme was launched by France and Germany.
14 It  is  therefore  hard to  say  what  to  expect  in  the  long run in  terms of  armaments
cooperation. The EU has plans for enhanced post-Brexit defence research cooperation,
as stated in the EU’s Global Strategy or in the Franco-German call for an EU operational
headquarters,  a  common  budget  for  military  research  and  joint  procurement
capabilities,  as  well  as  for  the  use  of  the  “permanent  structured  cooperation”
provisions of the EU treaties.31 The UK is unlikely to be part of such reinforced EU
cooperation. But France is the only EU member state that is willing to move forward on
defence matters, apart from Germany and Italy, albeit sometimes reluctantly.
15 The main difficulty for future Franco-British armaments cooperation will be political as
France might find it hard to express support for a stronger EU defence policy while
reinforcing  cooperation  with  a  non-EU  partner  and  might  ending  up  choosing
cooperation with other EU partners if it proves more advantageous. Another difficulty
might arise from EU market regulation as the UK might have difficulties accessing the
market  after  Brexit.  This  would inevitably  make cross-border defence industry and
cooperation in the field of procurement more difficult and therefore more expansive,
depending on the arrangement found by the UK and the EU. Finally, there is much
uncertainty around the state  of  the British economy and financial  consequences of
Brexit.  The  Pound  Sterling  has  already  declined  sharply  since  June  2016  and  this
devaluation of the British currency puts high pressure on the UK defence budget. The
UK may especially  encounter difficulties  paying for equipment bought from the US
when the pound slides against the dollar. If, as some predict, Brexit is followed by an
economic  crisis  involving  a  recession,  this  situation  would  get  even  worse.  The
Covid-19 crisis will also have long-lasting effects on the British economy, because of the
lockdown restrictions it  entailed.  The much-expected Integrated Security,  Defence  and
Foreign Policy Review that was due to be published by the government in early 2020 has
been  delayed  and  the  review  process  will  now  have  to  address  the  international
implications of the pandemic as well as uncertainties around the UK’s budget following
the coronavirus outbreak32. Therefore, from a financial perspective, there is still a good
case for cooperation between France and the UK, but as far as conventional armament
is  concerned,  British  perspectives  look  quite  dire  and  the  country  may  encounter
further difficulties after Brexit.
 
The Strategic Rationale for Cooperation
16 The Franco-British defence relationship was largely built upon the idea that the two
states had a broadly shared understanding of when and how it is appropriate to use
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military force. France was regarded as one of various few serious partners for the UK
precisely because of their readiness to intervene abroad. This view was widely shared
by military officials and politicians who acknowledged that France and Britain had a
broadly similar level of defence ambition.33
17 It was this view that led the two countries to build a joint expeditionary force. The
Combined  Joint  Expeditionary  Force  (CJEF)  draws  upon  British  and  French  Armed
Forces (land, air and maritime components) together with command and control and
support functions. It is not a permanent standing force but it is meant to be available at
notice for bilateral operations. The aim of the CJEF is to be able to carry out high-
intensity military deployments which would rapidly launch operations that could then
be taken over by other allies, including NATO or the EU. Since the creation of the CJEF
was announced in 2010, progress has been made and the force was tested in April 2016
with  Exercise  “Griffin  Strike.” The  exercise  was  successful  and  the  force  was
“validated,” opening a new five-year bilateral training plan for the 2017-2022 period.
Yet, however politically significant the CJEF may have been – as a sign that Franco-
British cooperation had concrete results – many doubts remain as to the context in
which  this  force  could  be  deployed,  as  well  as  about  the  relationship  it  has  with
organisations like the EU or NATO.
18 This  new  Franco-British  strategic  ambition  has  also  translated  into  cooperation  in
military  interventions.  The  main  joint  operation  that  followed  the  signing  of  the
Lancaster House Treaties was the intervention in Libya in 2011. The operation that led
to the toppling of Muammar Gaddafi only took place a few months after the signing of
the Lancaster House Treaties but was presented as proof that the two states – and their
armed forces – could successfully fight alongside each other. However, in August 2013,
British  MPs  voted down a  planned intervention against  the  Assad  regime in  Syria,
leading France to worry about the UK’s readiness to fight. Besides, even if there has
been some British support for other French interventions in Mali, the Central African
Republic  and for  Barkhane,  France’s  main partner  remains  the US,  with whom the
tradition of cooperation is older and feels more familiar to some senior officers.34
19 There  have  been  some strains  in  the  Franco-British  military  cooperation  and  both
British  and  French  officers  are  more  accustomed  to  working  with  their  US
counterparts. But more effective cooperation between the two main European military
forces  still  seems  to  be  needed  in  spite  of  Brexit.  On  the  British  side,  there  is  a
recognition that the US might not the reliable partner that is used to be, and remaining
close to other European partners is seen as a safe option. On the French part, in spite of
concerns about British reliability, the UK remains a more convincing partner than any
other European state, including Germany. One of the most recent signs of that was the
creation  of  a  European  Intervention  Initiative  (E2I),  following  President  Macron’s
proposal  in  his  Sorbonne  speech  in  September  2017.  The  aim of  this  new military
project is to allow a shared strategic culture to emerge among participant states. The
E2I was built outside the EU framework in order to allow the UK to act as an equal
partner rather than a third state like in CSDP missions or PESCO (Permanent Structured
Cooperation) projects. This has been widely interpreted as a way of allowing the UK not
to be isolated after Brexit.35 But the E2I also points out France’s frustration with other
EU partners and its will to find more efficient alternatives to CSDP.
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A bilateral alternative to CSDP?
20 In  the  preamble  to  the  Treaty  for  Defence  and  Security  Co-operation,  bilateral
cooperation is presented as a way of reinforcing the two states’ involvement in the
international  organisations  responsible  for  European  defence,  including  NATO  and
CSDP. However, precisely because the treaty was signed outside the EU framework, it
can be argued that it is the result of the Atlanticist and Eurosceptic orientations of the
British government of the time.36 Yet the treaty is also the result of a longstanding
process of cooperation that started with the Saint-Malo Declaration in 1998 and that
has resisted several changes of government both in France and in the UK. The way
bilateral cooperation articulates with CSDP has thus been presented in different ways
in France or in the UK, depending on the role ascribed to the EU in relation to their
national role conceptions. 
21 Traditionally,  France  has  been  attached  to  the  idea  of  independence  in  national
security and French foreign and defence policy decisions have built on Gaullist beliefs
in the primacy and “grandeur” of the nation state. In this perspective, as Ronja Kempin
argues, European security cooperation was seen originally as a French instrument to
guarantee France could maintain its international role.37 As it had lost its ability to play
a  forefront  role  on  the  international  stage,  for  example  by  launching  military
interventions on its own, cooperation with other member states was seen as a workable
alternative, on the condition that forces would not be integrated. According to another
narrative, the EU was perceived as a prolongation of France and of French values and
interests in the world.38 The defence of France being tied to the defence of Europe, it
seemed  necessary  to  reinforce  European  capabilities  for  the  continent  to  become
strong in security. The two narratives share a common focus on autonomy in security
affairs. In one narrative, this autonomy was for a France supported by a cooperative
European framework, in the other, Europe itself was to be autonomous. But in any case,
France was to inspire Europe’s strategic choices. As a result, the failure of CSDP would
mean France had few reasons to remain involved any more.
22 Lack of progress on military capabilities in CSDP, especially after the French 2008 EU
Presidency,  convinced  the  French  that  CSDP  would  remain  a  low-level  crisis
management vehicle.39 There were few industrial breakthroughs and government and
industry alike grew weary of the slow progress on collaborative projects. Moreover,
Germany, France’s traditional partner in the construction of the EU, was not ready to
build and use defence capabilities in the way France had hoped. In this context, the UK
remains France’s only reliable partner in Europe.
23 As far as the UK is concerned, the development of a European defence has been met
with caution for two main reasons. Firstly, even when Britain finally joined the EEC in
1973, it did not renounce its global ambitions and successive leaders insisted the UK
had a role to play outside Europe which did not necessarily involve other European
partners.  Secondly,  the role  of  outsider Britain adopted with regard to the EU was
strongly associated with its ambition to become a “bridge” between the two sides of the
Atlantic.  British  Atlanticism  has  aimed  at  keeping  the  US  involved  in  European
security, especially through its commitment to NATO, even if some governments have
been  keener  to  acknowledge  the  role  CSDP  could  play,  like  Tony  Blair’s  Labour
government did after the signing of the 1998 Saint-Malo Declaration. But by 2010, at
the  time  of  the  signing  of  the  Lancaster  House  treaties,  Britain  did  not  actively
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participate  in  CSDP  anymore.  The  more  Eurosceptic  Conservative  members  of  the
coalition, like then Defence secretary Liam Fox, strongly influenced the government’s
attitude to new EU initiatives in the field of defence which were repeatedly vetoed. On
the other hand, war weariness was widespread, especially among Liberal Democrats
and  some  Conservatives.  The  consequences  of  the  2003  war  in  Iraq  meant  Prime
Minister Cameron and Foreign Secretary Hague’s liberal interventionism was not fully
embraced by members of the coalition, which also had consequences on the country’s
relationship with the USA. In this context, cooperation with France was seen as way for
Britain to satisfy its ambition to retain its global power status while neither getting
further involved in CSDP missions nor compromising its traditional Atlanticism.40
24 Therefore, albeit for different reasons, France and the UK were frustrated with CSDP. In
recent years, EU defence spending has slightly increased.41 But even if this might be
encouraging for the future of CSDP, there is no guarantee that the money will meet
French  strategic  priorities  or  French  industrial  interests.  Besides,  although  extra-
spending and extra-ambitions by other European member states were welcomed by
French officials, it remains unclear whether they could meet the strategic targets set by
France. This explains why French Defence minister Le Drian was keen to ensure that
Brexit would not affect the Lancaster House Treaties.
25 British Defence minister Michael Fallon’s initial response to Brexit was to stress the
UK’s Atlanticism and reaffirm the role of NATO as the “cornerstone of our defence.”42
Yet Britain will continue to face the same threats as the continent. As far as security is
concerned, both MI5 director general Andrew Parker and High Representative Federica
Mogherini have insisted that British and EU security depended on further collaboration
between British and European security agencies.43 Future arrangements in the field of
security are therefore crucial both for the EU and the UK and Michel Barnier quickly
announced that, given the issue’s importance, the EU wanted to avoid “any trade-off
between security  and trade” even if  Brexit  inevitably  would have consequences  on
future cooperation.44
26 Besides, the UK’s commitment to NATO as the main defence actor in Europe may raise
questions  given  the  attitude  of  the  USA  which  may  threaten  the  future  of  the
organisation.  Even  before  Donald  Trump  was  elected  President,  the  US  insisted
European  member  states  of  NATO  should  contribute  more  to  their  own  defence.
President  Obama’s  Asia-oriented  foreign  policy  confirmed  it  was  now  urgent  for
Europeans to play a  greater role  in the defence of  their  own continent but also in
military  operations  in  their  immediate  neighbourhood.  Trump’s  election  did  not
change these  broad strategic  decisions and the 2019 NATO London Summit  further
exposed tensions in the Alliance.45
27 But beyond NATO, it is the very UK-US “special relationship” that has been questioned.
Theresa  May  was  the  first  foreign  head  of government  to  meet  Trump  after  his
inauguration as President. The two leaders insisted on the “bonds of history, of family,
kinship and common interests” between the two countries on which closer bonds, in
commerce, business and foreign affairs could be built.46 Yet recent developments like
Trump’s unilateral decision to withdraw from the Paris climate accord, to move the US
embassy in Israel to Jerusalem, to scrap the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action signed
with Iran, or to withdraw the US from the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF)
treaty show the UK’s vision is closer to that of other EU countries than to America’s,47
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and that even if cooperation with Europe, and in particular with France, is not Britain’s
first choice, there is no other credible option, even after Brexit.
 
Conclusion
28 French and British diplomats, senior civil servants and senior military officers have all
very quickly signalled that bilateral cooperation would move forward after Brexit, just
as it survived political changes in both countries in the last few years. As far as military
cooperation is concerned, ties between the two countries’ armed forces are now much
stronger than they were nine years ago when the treaties were signed, with French and
British  chiefs  of  staff  and  senior  officers  meeting  regularly.  As  far  as  industrial
cooperation is concerned, the latest agreements signed by French and British Defence
ministers have confirmed the forefront role MBDA is expected to play in the future of
bilateral,  and even European integration.  Politically however,  as Brexit  negotiations
unfolded,  the  relation  between  French  and  British  leaders  has  got  tenser.  Even  if
bilateral cooperation is unlikely to be jeopardised by Brexit, further political tensions
could considerably slow it down.
29 As far as European defence is concerned, CSDP is unlikely to make serious progress.
Brexit has led EU member states, to launch (or relaunch) a number of initiatives that
were previously vetoed by the UK. But there have been few concrete decisions about
the future of CSDP since 2016, which has served to underline the fact that the UK was
far from being sole responsible for the lack of progress on European defence. The CSDP
is therefore likely to remain an instrument with limited use and ambitions.
30 But at a time when the US commitment to European defence has become unpredictable
and  the  continent  is  faced  with  an  increasing  number  of  threats,  bilateral  and
multilateral arrangements that aim at keeping the UK close to other EU defence and
security initiatives are crucial. In this perspective Franco-British cooperation is a major
contribution to the defence of the continent.
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ABSTRACTS
Following the UK’s decision to leave the EU, British foreign and defence policy discourse has been
inspired by the “Global Britain” narrative. But this narrative only makes sense as far as Britain is
able  to  establish  or  maintain  ambitious  partnerships  either  with  the  EU  or  with  individual
member states. This paper analyses the rationale behind the deepening of bilateral cooperation
with France in order to show that it remains crucial if Britain wants to maintain its role as one of
the main actors in European defence and security policy.
Ten  years  after  the  signing  of  the  November  2010  Lancaster  House  treaties  on  defence  and
security  and  on  nuclear  cooperation,  this  paper  uses  a  role  theory  approach  to  recall  the
strategic, political and economic rationales for bilateral cooperation and examine the current
state of Franco-British relations. Brexit puts this cooperation at risk – with Emmanuel Macron
calling  for  a  stronger  EU  based  on  a  reinforced  Franco-German  partnership  –  and  recent
developments in defence cooperation in Europe – with the implementation of the Permanent
Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the creation of the European Intervention Initiative (EI2) –
raise questions about the respective roles of France and the UK. But this paper also shows that
the  current  international  context  reinforces  the  case  for  close  Franco-British  defence  and
security relations that are beneficial for both partners, as well as for the EU.
Depuis  la  décision  du  Royaume-Uni  de  quitter  l’Union  européenne,  le  discours  de  politique
étrangère  et  de  défense  britannique  est  fondé  sur  l’idée  d’une  Grande-Bretagne  à  vocation
mondiale.  Mais  cette  idée  n’a  de  sens  que  si  le  pays  parvient  à  établir  ou  à  maintenir  des
partenariats ambitieux tant avec l’UE qu’avec ses États-membres. Cet article analyse les raisons
qui ont poussé à une coopération approfondie avec la France afin de montrer qu’elle demeure
essentielle si le Royaume-Uni entend conserver son rôle d’acteur de premier plan de la politique
de défense et de sécurité européenne.
Dix ans après la  signature des accords de Lancaster House de novembre 2010 en matière de
défense et de sécurité ainsi que de coopération nucléaire, cet article fait appel à une approche
fondée  sur  la  théorie  des  rôles  pour  rappeler  les  motivations  stratégiques,  politiques  et
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économiques  de  la  coopération  bilatérale  et  examiner  l’état  actuel  des  relations  franco-
britanniques.  Le Brexit  constitue une menace pour cette coopération à l’heure où Emmanuel
Macron  appelle  de  ses  vœux une  UE  plus  forte  fondée  sur  un  partenariat  franco-allemand
renforcé. Les changements récents dans le domaine de la coopération européenne de défense,
notamment la mise en œuvre de la Coopération structurée permanente (PESCO) et la création de
l’Initiative européenne d’intervention (EI2), soulèvent des interrogations sur les rôles respectifs
de la France et du Royaume-Uni. Mais cet article démontre également que, dans les domaines de
la défense et de la sécurité, le contexte international actuel renforce la nécessité de relations
franco-britanniques étroites aux conséquences bénéfiques pour les deux partenaires, mais aussi
pour l’UE.
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